Supplemental Jurisdiction and the Boundaries of Federal Judicial Power.

By Arjan Bir Sodhi for  Lex Republica.

Federal civil procedure strongly favors resolving related disputes in a single forum. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody this preference by permitting broad joinder of claims and parties when disputes arise from the same underlying events. Procedural permission alone, however, does not resolve the jurisdictional question. A federal court may allow claims to be joined, but it cannot adjudicate them unless it possesses subject matter jurisdiction. Rule 82 codifies this limitation by providing that the Rules do not expand or otherwise affect federal jurisdiction. This conflict between efficiency and constitutional limits is at the heart of supplemental jurisdiction.
This conflict becomes most apparent in cases where a plaintiff pursues claims under federal and state law in a single lawsuit. Take a common example. The plaintiff sues a local police department for using excessive force during an arrest. He asserts a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on a Fourth Amendment violation. Simultaneously, he asserts a claim for battery under state law based on the same incident. The rules on joinder allow both claims to proceed. Rule 18 simply states that a plaintiff may assert claims against a defendant in a single lawsuit. Rule 20 further states that it is satisfactory to attach additional defendants if they are involved in a similar transaction or occurrence. None of these steps addresses the question of whether a federal court is allowed to hear claims brought under state law.

Standing alone, the battery claim would fall outside federal jurisdiction. The parties are not diverse, and the claim arises exclusively under state law.Had the plaintiff filed it independently in federal court, dismissal would be required. The jurisdictional posture changes only because the state claim accompanies a substantial federal question. Whether the federal court may hear it depends on the doctrine now known as supplemental jurisdiction.
The constitutional foundation for this doctrine was articulated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, a decision that continues to shape federal jurisdiction nearly six decades later.In Gibbs, the Supreme Court addressed whether Article III permits federal courts to hear state law claims that lack an independent jurisdictional basis but are factually intertwined with a federal claim. The Court answered in the affirmative, grounding its reasoning in the Constitution’s use of the term “case,” rather than “claim.” When a federal court properly exercises jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim, it acquires authority over the entire constitutional case, not merely a single legal theory.That authority extends to state law claims that arise from a common nucleus of operative fact and would ordinarily be tried together in one proceeding. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966
The Gibbs analysis creates the two-tiered inquiry. First, there is the issue of determining if there is constitutional power to hear the claim based on state law in federal court. Such constitutional power is shown if the federal issue is substantial and there is overlap in the state and federal claims based on the factual narrative. Second, if there is constitutional power, there is the question of whether it should be exercised. The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is not mandatory. "The Supreme Court made it clear that in assessing the propriety of supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts should take account of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, and that there will be situations in which federal courts should refrain from resolving unnecessary issues of state law, for example, where federal claims are dismissed preliminarily, where state issues predominate, and where the danger of jury confusion outweighs the benefits of judicial economy."
The rules remained this way for a number of decades until challenged by cases such as Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), and Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), and until Congress stepped in with 28 U.S.C. Section 1367 to codify and clarify the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. The challenge to these rules caused a great deal of uncertainty surrounding pendent and ancillary jurisdiction until codification occurred.

Section 1367(a) generally grants broad power to federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over every claim that is part of the same Article III case or controversy as a claim within the court’s original jurisdiction. This section also incorporates the joinder and intervention of other parties, evidencing the Congressional desire to grant broad functional scope to Gibbs. Nevertheless, section 1367(b) establishes critical bounds in diversity actions, foreclosing a plaintiff from depriving a court of complete diversity jurisdiction by strategic plaintiff joinder. Section 1367(c) codifies and carries forward the discretionary framework of Gibbs, allowing courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in those instances where state law issues are substantially predominate, where state law issues are novel and complex, where federal claims are dismissed, and for other compelling reasons.
As a matter of procedure, the doctrine permits federal courts to determine the matter in the way that it presents itself, as opposed to how the jurisdiction is divided. The doctrine thus maintains a balance between the federal interest in the matter in question and the limitations placed on the scope of federal authority by the United States Constitution.
Supplemental jurisdiction is more than simply a technical doctrine. It bears important implications in terms of choice of forum, litigation, and allocation of judicial power in federal versus state systems. Its implications are crucial in comprehending how federal systems of justice deal with disputes involving multiple sources of law.

Conclusion: Supplemental Jurisdiction in Modern Practice
Almost sixty years after the historic decision in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs that laid the constitutional groundwork for entertaining related claims under state law in federal courts, the basis for supplemental jurisdiction has evolved to be based on constitutional as well as statutory authority.
The Court under Article III is allowed to hear entire “cases” and “controversies,” and not just claims. The definition of “common nucleus of operative fact” as defined in Gibraltar v. Tennessee, posits a standard to judge constitutional power as defined in the Gibbs decision, and it is considered a touchstone. Later legislation a mandated this under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a) to allow federal courts to hear all claims with a nexus to claims in its jurisdiction.
But § 1367 also sets sensible limits. Subsection (b) safeguards the structural component of diversity jurisdiction, and subsection (c) preserves judicial discretion to waive jurisdiction if the interests of the United States are no longer sufficiently vindicated in federal courts. These provisions collectively embody a thoughtful balance. They facilitate efficiencies in litigation while also taking cognizance of the limits placed by the Constitution on the power of federal courts and the ongoing role of state tribunals in resolving state law disputes.

In modern practice, supplemental jurisdiction operates as a gatekeeping doctrine rather than a blank check. It enables federal courts to hear disputes in their full factual context, but only when doing so serves both constitutional principles and sound judicial administration.

References

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).

Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).

Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).

Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442 (2d Cir. 1998).

28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 18.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.