Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975): The Case That Rewired California Negligence Law

By Arjan Sodhi

Few state supreme court decisions have reshaped California tort law as dramatically as Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975). What began as an ordinary traffic collision in Los Angeles became the vehicle for a sweeping doctrinal shift  one that abandoned more than a century of California precedent and replaced the rigid, unforgiving rule of contributory negligence with the modern doctrine of pure comparative negligence.

In other words, Li marks the moment California stopped treating negligence as a lottery and started treating it as an allocation.

The Collision That Changed the Doctrine

On a November night in 1968, Nga Li attempted a left turn across several lanes of traffic on Alvarado Street. At the same time, a Yellow Cab driver crested a hill traveling at an unsafe speed and entered the intersection on a yellow light. The taxi struck the rear of Li’s car, causing significant injuries.

The trial court found fault on both sides  Li for making an unsafe turn, and the cab driver for traveling too fast  but under the doctrine of contributory negligence, any fault by Li was enough to bar her from recovery completely. The court entered judgment for the defendants.

On appeal, Li challenged not just the judgment, but the very doctrine that made the judgment possible.

The Central Question: Was California Ready to Abandon Contributory Negligence?

For more than a century, California followed the traditional common-law rule:
If the plaintiff contributed in any way to her own harm, recovery was barred.
This “all-or-nothing” approach survived despite heavy criticism from scholars, judges, and practitioners who saw it as both illogical and unjust. A slightly negligent plaintiff could recover nothing; a highly negligent defendant could escape liability entirely.

The Court in Li confronted that reality head-on.

The Court’s Reasoning

Justice Sullivan’s majority opinion concluded that contributory negligence no longer served modern notions of fairness or logic. The Court held:

1. Comparative negligence better reflects fault.
Liability should be proportionate, not absolute. A system that imposes the full burden on one party when both are negligent defies basic fairness.

2. The Civil Code did not freeze the doctrine in place.
Defendants argued that Civil Code § 1714 had “codified” contributory negligence and left the courts powerless to change it. The Court rejected this interpretation, explaining that the Civil Code was intended as a continuation — not a fossilization — of the common law. Judicial evolution remained permissible.

3. Practical concerns were real but manageable.
Yes, comparative negligence complicates jury instructions. Yes, fault allocation among multiple parties can be messy. But these practical difficulties were not enough to justify retaining an inequitable doctrine.

4. California would adopt the “pure” version of comparative negligence.
Some states use a modified system that bars recovery if the plaintiff is 50% or more at fault. The Court rejected this threshold approach as an illogical halfway measure. Instead, California would recognize that even a 90% negligent plaintiff may still recover 10% of her damages.

5. Limited retroactivity.
The new rule would apply to all cases not yet tried, including Li’s.

What Li Means for California Tort Law

Li v. Yellow Cab is not merely a doctrinal update — it is a philosophical shift. The Court embraced a model that treats fault as a spectrum, not a switch. In doing so, it aligned California with a growing national trend and reaffirmed the judiciary’s authority to modernize common-law doctrines when they become unjust or obsolete.

The decision also swept away two doctrines that had grown entangled with contributory negligence:

Last Clear Chance  abolished

Assumption of Risk absorbed into comparative fault when it overlaps negligence principles

The result is a more coherent system, one that asks a single central question:
How much did each party contribute to the harm?

Why Li Still Matters Today

Nearly every modern California negligence case carries the DNA of Li. From auto collisions to premises liability, the question of comparative fault is now foundational. The case also stands as a reminder of the judiciary’s capacity to correct inequities in judge-made doctrines, even when those doctrines have deep historical roots.

In a broader sense, Li represents what happens when courts acknowledge the realities of how juries, lawyers, and litigants actually operate  and reform doctrine to match the world rather than an outdated ideal.

For a state as legally influential as California, Li did more than change the rules; it reset the logic of civil justice.

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